I am pretty damn sure that, when we were colleagues at Finance (under Fraser), we didn’t shrink from spelling out those unpleasant alternatives. I certainly remember getting plenty of rebuffs. But not the boot.

And I am just as sure that we would both feel mighty uncomfortable about doing the same in the present public service culture.

Bob Hawke inherited John Stone and kept him out of respect for basic conservative values (and a range of other factors, like demonstrating that the ALP were not a bunch of yahoos both to the ALP itself and to the electorate). Part of the point of conventions about public service independence, is that you don’t immediately go and sack anyone who was appointed by your predecessor even if you think they’re not very sympathetic to your views.

John Howard sacked 5 secretaries of Departments on assuming office, and we get a lecture about Whitlam. As for Wran, I was unaware that Askin had a strong commitment to integrity of any kind, whether it was in the public service or elsewhere.

There is, however, an easy way to limit some of the damage that this type of control causes. All ministerial advice could be tabled in Parliament. At least the opposition and media, if diligent enough, could see the way in which large sections of a particular department had been suborned from thier appointed tasks to providing a research and re-election facility to the current government.

I don’t believe that Tony Harris (or pretty well anyone else) would argue otherwise. His column certainly suggests no such thing. But the public service culture under Howard (and it started to develop much earlier, from the time new managerialism and the SES were introduced) seems to be that the PS should give only the sort of advice that the government wants to hear, and should refrain from telling Ministers anything that they migh prefer not to know. It’s the “including alternatives” bit that doesn’t happen now as it once did. Moreover, the advice on alternatives must include a frank and fearless evaluation of all foreseeable consequences, both positive and negative, that will flow from the various available alternatives. It is certainly then up to the elected government to make an informed choice from among those available alternatives, and the PS is indeed then expected to implement that choice, while the elected government wears the electoral consequences of its choice.

The Howard government prefers to insulate itself from possible blame by only being told the things that suit it, so that Ministers can avoid accountability for their choices and blame the public servants instead. As Tony demonstrates, public servants who understand and follow these unwritten rules are rewarded by promotion, while those who expose the Minister to embarrassment (by giving the very frank and fearless advice which genuine accountability rquires) can look forward to a much bleaker future. It’s a perversion of Westminster principles, and indeed of any coherent principle of accountability.

A scandalous state of affairs and on whom nary a soundbite has been wasted in support by both sides (the same side?) of politics, especially here in S.A. given that this is his probable domicile.

Not necessarily big wig public servants but just those that point out frequent inconsistencies under Minister X or Prime Minister Y.