And I’m not advocating Currency Lad’s position on this either. But I do accept his perspective, and that the two perspectives: current reality (commonly spoken now) and projected reality (from C.L.’s viewpoint) are not necessarily in conflict.

I say this also because there seems now a bit of a similar gungho attitude from those who didn’t support the war, as a general vibe – much, much less than the gungho madness of those who supported it, granted – but enough to wonder if there is merit in trying not to fall into the same trap the original supporters did.

May I have another shot at this different perspective as I understand it from the only one visibly speaking up otherwise?

It seems that C.L. is coming from a perspective which places events of the Iraq war into a picture which allows for all these horrors, as horrible in ‘reverse’, say, as the landing on Gallipoli – but that overall the good guys won the war and the world was better for it.

Which means that from his point of view, the perspective which speaks of the horrors and failings is not unlike seeing the Iraqi’s as if they were Gallipolians – give me a second on that. I don’t want to raise any kneejerks on this. But check it out, in likeness of this sort: What you have is suffering in horrific style (not invoking scale here), whereupon those who suffered went on to receive the tremendous benefits after a longer period of time.

That is, the Gallipolians as part of the greater picture had the horrors but the people they represented and/or were a part of went on to prosper.

Translated to Iraq: those who are suffering horrors are placed in a longer term perspective to obtain tremendous prosperity from it.

Now, in C.L.’s perspective, there’s even more value than that. He’s saying, in effect, that both sides obtain tremendous value.

This is a blog comment and I’ve probably said all that poorly. And it’s a gift to kneejerkers for sure.

But upon reflection, including the difficulties in C.L’s vision mentioned by knowledgeable commenters above, why cannot it be so that the Iraq war in a longer time will deliver prosperity to Iraq and the US? That’s the debate we now need to have.

This means that, I imagine, a much longer term assessment needs to be made from those who can informatively provide it. That, if you like, is the challenge at the feet, today, of those who did not support the war and who accept the obvious immediate problems. As one who didn’t support the war, and doesn’t have knowledge as to the long term possibilities, that’s a debate I’m seeking to learn from, from you knowledgeable commenters.

**

That said, these are the things C.L’s perspective asks. It asks questions of this premise: “that overall the good guys won the war and the world was better for it.” (That appears the end result of his/this viewpoint. This could be watered down to “the right thing was done, and the right result had”, but it speaks of the former).

There certainly appears,in this/his perspective, that there are good guys and bad guys. Does this mean this perspective includes or, heck, is born of a personally inherent spiritual fight for a particular type of world order? Or if not, that this perspective includes a give and take from each so overall prosperity can come?

Also: whose world is better for it?

I’d like to learn that from C.L, as well.

***

Overall in today’s circumstances though, it’s been informative so far, from all concerned.

I don’t know anything about the Gulf News.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,1249701,00.html

US President George W. Bush is said to be extremely upset by the results of a recent survey that explored the opinion of Iraqis three-and-half-years after the invasion. According to the survey, conducted jointly by the Iraq Centre for Research and Strategic Studies (ICRSS) and the Gulf Research Centre, only five per cent of those questioned said Iraq is better today than in 2003. While 95 per cent felt the security situation was worse than before. The poll also revealed that nearly half of Iraqis favour an immediate withdrawal of the US-led forces; and 66 per cent felt the security situation would improve if the international coalition troops left.

Their “democratic government” has even worse poll numbers than Bush:

Full cooperation from the Iraqi government concerning the disbanding of all militias is essential for the success of the new plan. Yet, the survey of the ICRSS does not seem promising in this regard also. The poll found that between 84 and 91 per cent of Iraqis regarded the US-backed Nouri Al Maliki government’s performance as “very poor” in the implementation of promises, reconstruction efforts, dealing with sectarian strife, providing jobs and basic necessities. Only about 1.5-3 per cent of them rated the government’s work as “good”. This constitutes another major challenge for Bush’s new Iraq strategy.

http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/01/06/10094619.html

The real problem is the lamentable failure of the US to have any foresight whatsoever as to what would happen after the overthrow of Saddam, not the incompetence defence. Yes, the occupation was completely incompetent but it is at the heart of just war theory, I’d have thought, that you don’t go to war without a clear perception of what the peace should be like and a strategy as to how to get there.

Absolutely. Not least of the wickednesses perpetrated by Bush is his refusal to contemplate real sacrifices in his own political position (eg forgoing tax cuts, a draft) in an attempt to make good on that promise. And the least the dwindling band of war supporters like C.L. can do to show they have some integrity left is to demand accountability – ie resignations – from the great and powerful who have misled and blundered at every turn.

But what do you do if you can’t possibly deliver on that promise, even with draconian sacrifices? Because that is clearly the situation we’re in now.

In early 2003, Iran indirectly sent a proposal to the US for wide ranging talks. Clearly troubled by the rapid success of the US invasion/liberation, they were as open as one was ever likely to find them. This is how the Washington Post summarised its contents:

The document lists a series of Iranian aims for the talks, such as ending sanctions, full access to peaceful nuclear technology and a recognition of its “legitimate security interests.” Iran agreed to put a series of U.S. aims on the agenda, including full cooperation on nuclear safeguards, “decisive action” against terrorists, coordination in Iraq, ending “material support” for Palestinian militias and accepting the Saudi initiative for a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The document also laid out an agenda for negotiations, with possible steps to be achieved at a first meeting and the development of negotiating road maps on disarmament, terrorism and economic cooperation. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061700727_pf.html

No response from the US. As far as it was concerned, it held the winning hand and had absolutely no need to negotiate with anyone. You may recall it was also at this time entirely dismissive of any real UN involvement.

Earlier, in late 2001, the US and Iran had cooperated in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and there had been signs this tactical cooperation could develop into something more strategic. We know how this ended of course with the “axis of evil” speech in early 2002.

Iran has, unfortunately but inevitably, been the clear strategic winner from the last four years and has also been re-radicalised after a period of tentative openness and rapprochement in the late 90s and early part of this decade. George Bush and his administration have, sadly and somewhat ironically, been marvellous allies for Ahmadinejad and the hardliners.

It’s not a matter of hoping Iran and Syria might “help” the US as an act of generosity. It’s a matter of recognising that they, in particular Iran, are powerful and permanent players in the Middle East and that no lasting solution is likely unless it at least has their grudging acceptance. It will of course be much more difficult to negotiate with Iran now than it would have been 3-4 years ago but it is by no means monolithic and negotiations are far more likely to encourage the ascent of the more moderate factions than is continued confrontation. As for Syria, it has repeatedly shown itself open to trying to find mutually beneficial solutions.

So, “realist” . . . . .? Well, if true it doesn’t really seem such a terrible moniker to me. In a way it’s rather amusing that it should be for some such an expression of contempt.

The “realist”

Beyond parody.

As long as we’re there militarily, some Sunni insurgent groups will be more likely to cooperate with jihadis and the day when the domestic factions are forced to begin dealing with each other and suppressing the utterly destructive influence of those bent on chaos and terrorism will be indefinitely delayed. The very idea of a united Iraq is losing cogency with each day that passes.

Unfortunately, Bush’s refusal to talk with Iran and Syria in turn denies any opportunity to constructively engage the various interested regional parties. As far as I can judge, there are very few outside the White House who still profess to believe there’s any possibility of a military solution to this catastrophe.

That the last 3-4 years have been an immense boon to the extremists in the Muslim world is I think accepted by all but the most intellectually shuttered. The long term consequences of continuing to feed this growing, and in my view partially justified anger and frustration are just horrendous.

Quite what should be done is clearly something about which people of goodwill can and will disagree. In principle, though, it seems to me that any solution ought to:

1) Make it clear that the purpose is not a long term occupation. The vast amounts being spent on long term bases and the US embassy are a propoganda gift to all those who wish to sow discord and hatred. And a source of real concern and cynicism to those who wish Iraq well.

2) Avoid deals like the proposed oil legislation which reinforce the impression that it really was at least in part about exploitation of Iraqi resources.

(As an aside, given that these two aims may well have been part of what I suspect was from the start a confused, highly divided set of goals within different parts of the US power structure, explicitly and meaningfully disavowing these goals would probably take something close to an internal revolution within the US).

3) Promise truly significant and ongoing sums to reconstruction and development efforts and make it clear that their use is to be as much as possible in the hands of the Iraqis themselves.

4) Where it can be safely done — which is probably not often in the current anarchic situation — offer expertise and aid where requested in areas like health, agriculture, sanitation and so on.

4) Attempt to genuinely engage with all Middle Eastern powers with the aim of discouraging attempts to capitalise on Iraqi instability and encourage their involvement in economic engagement and reconstruction.

Taken together with a clearly stated objective of disengaging militarily, such a set of goals and promises might just begin the long, slow process of restoring a little faith and making at least some amends for the disastrous consequences of our actions. However well meant they may have been in some cases. Unfortunately, except for getting rid of an appalling dictator, it’s hard to point to any other positive result of the our momentous decision to invade.

As for the domestic political consequences, I think Robert made some very good points. Perhaps if Rudd and co were to approach the whole matter in something like the above fashion, they could both carve out a meaningful, consistent and flexible position while making it very difficult for the government and its accolytes to use the tired but still marginally effective old argument against “cut and run”. It would also have the great virtue of constantly directing attention to the shallowness of the government’s “thinking” on this matter, both now and in the lead up to their fateful decision.

Well, there was an attempt to make it so but the electorate wasn’t interested. Latham wanted the troops brought home four or five weeks after polling day – that’s how desperately convinced Labor was that Iraq was a winner. So desperate were they that they forgot to make any commitment to leaving a security presence in place to protect Australian officials. So yeah, it was a big issue in 2004.

It was an accountability moment for Howard. He won.