Intellectual property and the flexibility of property rights: $100 bleg
Posted by Nicholas Gruen on Sunday, March 22, 2009
I’m doing some research on IP and particularly on patents. As in other areas of economics we tend to debate IP according to well arranged protocols. There’s a ‘pro’ and an ‘anti’ or a ‘more’ and a ‘less’ party with each accusing the other of not getting it. There’s lots legitimate to debate in there. But something else is important, and that is that IP is often defined in an antediluvian way.
The best way to make the point is by analogy. When airplanes first got themselves invented, the law of airspace was an expression of the Roman maxim “Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad caelum et ad inferos. Since you ask, this means “To whoever owns the land, shall belong the earth to its center and up to the heavens.” Of course in a world of zero transactions costs, there is no problem as all the transactions will be done to clear a plane’s flight from New York to Chicago over all the farms along the way. Of course that’s not very realistic. And so, as this a dumb way to build the law of airspace, as it was essentially unworkable, it got changed pretty quickly.
In patent law, the fundamental value of a patent arises from the exclusive right it gives you to sell into a market. But just for good measure you get a bundle of other exclusive rights – the right to manufacture, import, offer for sale, use and so it goes. Does this matter? Often not much. But big pharma have got themselves into such a bad place, such a low trust equilibrium in the way in which they interact with the world, that they cling to all these rights in their various campaigns to fight those who want more sensible outcomes – on the beaches and on the landing grounds, in the fields and in the streets. They will never willingly surrender any right they have.
Thus when drug patents are still running in Australia it should be possible for Australian generics firms to manufacture drugs that are still under patent in Australia where their patents have expired overseas. (In keeping with our sometime status as a ‘back office economy’ big pharma often apply for marketing approval in Australia later than in major markets and – though a chain of causation involving patent extensions I won’t bore you with here – this means drugs often come out of patent here a year or so after some markets have gone ‘generic’.)
But because patents are defined so broadly, Australian generics cannot manufacture for export until the patent runs out, and by that stage, they’ve already decamped to India or Canada where they don’t extend patents and so are better set up for their generics to hop into the market immediately.
I’m looking for some sources that discuss this issue – not necessarily regaring intellectual property rights, but property rights more generally. There’s some stuff on ‘patent thickets’ which often uses the example fo the panoply of poorly understood, and poorly fitting together property rights in post Soviet Russia – which created a property ‘thicket’ which prevented people using retail property properly – and saw stands and various makeshift tents and buildings being errected in front of old department stores, because noone could buy the department stores and develop them with any confidence in their property rights – or in their ability to be protected from others’ claims and probibitions on what they could do with their property.
Easements in real property and ‘fair use’ exceptions of interllectual property are similar examples of small changes to the definition fo property rights that can make a huge difference to the efficiency of a property regime. So I’m looking for some serious discussion of this topic in a generalised sense – but I can’t find much. I’ve Googled ‘the economics of easements’ and that didn’t do it for me.
I know that some people argue that one reason why English colonies were much more successful than others was that their legal system was more adaptive suited more to trying to enforce the changing mores of the society rather than just enforce strict rules. There is also an argument that in the South American colonies, there were absentee owners of land whose rights were upheld, which prevented systems of legal tenure from adapting to get the land utilised. By contrast in Australia we had squatters who the state did not prevent using the land whereas they did in the South American countries. So its an issue about the flexibility of property.
So, troppodillians, that’s my bleg, can you point me to any reading on this general issue, preferably with nice simple examples. And since this is part of a commercial research project, $100 to any commenter that is 1) the most useful and 2) is useful enough for me to feel like parting with the cash. If 2) is not met, the $100 goes to a charity of the commenters’ choice.


