From Paul Barratt’s recent piece for New Matilda – reproduced in Crikey.
In late 1998 I was directed by the then Defence Minister to give him a comprehensive report on the history of the Collins Class submarine and the matters that remained to be dealt with in order to bring the submarines into naval service. It was appropriate for advice on this subject to be signed by both the Secretary of the Department and the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF).
The CDF and I prepared and signed our joint advice and in early December I rang the Minister’s Chief of Staff to say that I was sending it to the Minister in that morning’s deliveries. I was asked not to. “Why not?” I asked.
“Because it mightn’t be what we wanted, and if it got out that we had received it and sent it back to be changed, that could be embarrassing for everyone. Just send it over ‘informally’, we’ll have a look at it, and if we need any changes we will get back to you”.
I informed the CDF of this turn of events and said that I was not prepared to play this sort of game. As the Minister was visiting the Department in two days’ time, I decided to hand it to him in person then.
The day came and I did just that handed the advice to the Minister in the presence of the CDF and the Minister’s Chief of Staff. This was 16 December 1998. It is a sign of the world now occupied by some Ministers that, weeks later, on 21 January 1999, the Minister told Max Moore-Wilton that he was still waiting for the report, and an article in The Age on 7 February 1999 referred to it as something “soon due to be delivered”.
The rationalisation for this position can only be that the advice was not sent through the Department’s Ministerial Correspondence Unit, and was therefore provided “informally”. So signed written advice handed from Secretary to Minister in the presence of the CDF can still leave the Minister able to say that he has not been told.