As Lateral Economics proposed in 2006 if you’re looking for taxes to cut to maximise growth, you can’t go past cutting company tax rates.
Now the research has been updated by this NBER working paper.
Simeon Djankov, Tim Ganser, Caralee McLiesh, Rita Ramalho, Andrei Shleifer
NBER Working Paper No. 13756
Issued in January 2008We present new data on effective corporate income tax rates in 85 countries in 2004. The data come from a survey, conducted jointly with PricewaterhouseCoopers, of all taxes imposed on “the same” standardized mid-size domestic firm. In a cross-section of countries, our estimates of the effective corporate tax rate have a large adverse impact on aggregate investment, FDI, and entrepreneurial activity. For example, a 10 percent increase in the effective corporate tax rate reduces aggregate investment to GDP ratio by 2 percentage points. Corporate tax rates are also negatively correlated with growth, and positively correlated with the size of the informal economy. The results are robust to the inclusion of controls for other tax rates, quality of tax administration, security of property rights, level of economic development, regulation, inflation, and openness to trade.
Oh – and there isn’t much evidence that cutting top marginal rates of tax improves economic outcomes (except of course for the direct beneficiaries of such policies).
Postscript on reading further.
Personal income tax does not enter the entrepreneurship regressions (which alleviates the concern that our corporate tax rates are
wrong for entrepreneurship), enters negatively and significantly the FDI regressions (although with small coefficients), and surprisingly enters positively and significantly for aggregate investment. The last result is a fluke caused by China and Vietnam, which have both very high personal tax rates and investment rates. Without them, there is no relationship. Overall, our main findings on corporate income taxes are robust to the inclusion of any of the additional tax rates we have considered. (p. 19 of the paper)
It is worth noting that that particular PwC report looks at, as literally as possible, all the taxes paid by companies and not just the income tax. In fact it produces a quite different ‘effective tax rate’ to the one in the annual report because it includes stuff like payroll tax, stamp duty, deposit tax, customs, net VAT/GST, etc and so forth for about another 45 types of ‘tax’.
I believe the report’s focus is not so much that the corporate income tax should be cut, but that taxes number 2-53 should be abolished even at the cost of increasing the corporate income tax, if necessary.
Although; of course, I agree with you and the report :)
SO I am not sure what that means!
Why is it that every discussion of company tax in Australia that quotes international evidence studiously ignores dividend imputation? Dividend imputation makes the incidence of our company tax quite different from those of places (such as the US) that run the classical “double tax” system.
In Australia, company tax is mostly just a withholding tax on the locals (that is, it is primarily an anti-avoidance measure, and a powerful one) and a tax on returns from investment by foreigners.
Given that most of our foreign investment is in mining and real estate, the latter makes it a good resources rent tax. And our chronic current account deficit argues that we don’t exactly have a lot of trouble attracting foreign capital anyway.
So I don’t think the deadweight loss of our company tax is anything like that of the US one, and it has powerful horizontal equity advantages.
DD – I wrote about dividend imputation in a paper for the Association of Certified Chartered Accountants last year.
I also an ARC Discovery (joint with Prof. Richard Heaney) looking at dividend imputation and Australian corporate tax. As you quite rightly indicate little is known about how the imputation system really impacts on decision making etc.
Impact is dependent on share register – lots of mums and dads/super funds = v. important to pay franked dividends (banks are an example).
But institutional investors report their figures (and determine their bonuses) on a cash basis, ie pre-tax – so they tend to be either neutral or even negative on franking.
Lots of other countries, in particular I think Mediterranean ones, used to have systems where, for example, post-tax dividends are non-assessable. I believe that this is still essentially the case – I think in France dividends are taxed at about 11% (in fact a ‘social contribution’ not a ‘tax’) but I am not sure if that is in addition to income tax or separate from.