Abstract: This paper presents the results from a series of framed field experiments conducted in fishing communities off the Caribbean coast of Colombia. The goal is to investigate the relative effectiveness of exogenous regulatory pressure and pro-social emotions in promoting cooperative behavior in a public goods context. The random public revelation of an individual’s contribution and its consequences for the rest of the group leads to significantly higher public good contributions and social welfare than regulatory pressure, even under regulations that are designed to motivate fully efficient contributions.
Recent Comments
- john walker on The Voice For John Stuart Mill
- Not Trampis on The Voice For John Stuart Mill
- David Walker on The Voice For John Stuart Mill
- johnrwalker on The Voice For John Stuart Mill
- johnrwalker on The Voice For John Stuart Mill
- Nicholas Gruen on The Voice For John Stuart Mill
- johnrwalker on The Voice For John Stuart Mill
- R. N. England on The Voice For John Stuart Mill
- johnrwalker on The Voice For John Stuart Mill
- Chris Lloyd on The Voice For John Stuart Mill
- R. N. England on The Voice For John Stuart Mill
- johnrwalker on Sotto Voce: The case for an informal vote
- A lucky boy from a golden age of economics | Club Troppo on Scaleability and the knowledge economy: or the micro-economics of hyper-bullshit
- Chris Lloyd on Sotto Voce: The case for an informal vote
- john walker on Sotto Voce: The case for an informal vote
Subscribe to Blog via Email
Categories
-
Authors
Archives
Author login and feeds
Academic
Alternative media (Australian)
Alternative media (international)
Arts
Business
Centrist
Economics and public policy
Left-leaning
Legal
Online media digests
Psephology/elections
Right-leaning