GLOBAL downturns are the fault lines around which our automotive industry has always reinvented itself. In theory, managers should restructure their businesses and businesses should change hands whenever it improves productivity.
Alas human nature intervenes. Corporate dreams are dreamt and restructuring is delayed … until the alternative is collapse. Way back in 1931, as the Great Depression savaged output at a South Australian automotive body manufacturer called Holden, US giant General Motors came to the rescue. The rest, as they say, is history.
VW, Leyland, Chrysler, Nissan and Mitsubishi all withdrew from car making in Australia – VW handing over to Nissan, Chrysler to Mitsubishi – long after they’d ceased to be healthy, all during crises for their parents and/or amid global downturns.
And here we are again.
After a ritual acknowledgment of the conventional wisdom that Australia is no good at making cars, the pundits peel off into ”protectionists” (sometimes dressed up as ”innovation” buffs) – who want to keep the industry alive with additional assistance – and ”free traders” who don’t. Count me among the free traders. But I’ve never bought the line that Australia couldn’t make cars without assistance.
Yes, some low-wage countries are gearing up production and, yes, our domestic market isn’t huge. But while lower-income countries will continue to grow market share in smaller, lower-quality cars, the bulk of production continues to be in high-income countries, particularly for larger, better cars. And though our market is small, so is Sweden’s. But Sweden has provided a volume base on which unique products have been built, which have then acquired export niches.
Toyota and Holden’s Australian operations have tapped into their parents’ global brands and marketing networks permitting rapid export growth. Rather than slaving away for decades building one’s presence in foreign markets, subsidiaries of global giants can win contracts with head office to supply specific market niches.
So far Toyota’s been the star, focusing all Australian production on one car line – the Camry/Aurion – manufacturing up to 150,000 units annually (right now it’s below 100,000) and consistently exporting more than half its production. Yet the Camry car line is produced in Japan and the US and if it comes to be produced in lower-cost locations, they could become preferred suppliers, first to our export markets, and ultimately to Australia.
Holden seems better placed because it manufactures unique vehicles around which more durable export niches might be able to be built. Our high exchange rate and the termination of the Pontiac brand have cruelled Holden’s exports recently, though it retains a monopoly on producing large rear wheel drive cars within GM’s network.
And then there’s Ford. Since the embarrassment of exporting the small, leaky, poorly finished convertible Capri to the US in the early 1990s, Ford US has shown scant interest in its Australian subsidiary’s entreaties to get serious about export from Australia. To utilise its assembly capacity it did some fine re-engineering of its Falcon car line to also produce the Ford Territory. But with flagging domestic Falcon sales and no serious exports, total volume is now around a third of Toyotas and Holdens which is hopelessly unviable. In fact Ford Australia still has great automotive assets, but they are not – and cannot be – strategically important for its current parent. Nevertheless they could be really valuable to up-and-coming Chinese or Indian car makers.
And while new Asian car makers gear up to export millions of small and medium-size cars, they’ll have little interest in making large cars like Falcons and Fairlanes. If they owned Ford’s Australian assets they’d get a foothold in our market and, more importantly, a large, sturdy, luxurious, rear-wheel drive car to badge with their own global marque. Would it be good public policy to subsidise such a transfer? Probably not. But since the current plan is to keep throwing good money after bad, let’s make that assistance conditional on a new owner or at least major equity partner and a global sourcing plan.
This idea was high-risk politics for as long as Ford was muddling through. But now the writing’s pretty much on the wall, the indignity of begging Ford to do us the favour of taking our money to hang around a little longer looks politically riskier still.