One of your worst posts Nicholas. You show a complete disregard and contempt for the legal system. It’s not meant to convict people of crimes they didn’t commit.
Jeremy Gans has a fascinating write up of His Honour and Groper and Sexual Harasser Du Jour Dyson Heydon and how Heydon, (or is that Dyson, no it’s Heydon), was the only High Court judge who saw the obvious sense in admitting similar fact evidence in cases like this. He argued it on slightly different grounds to those I’ve argued it on, but similar fact evidence in these cases is highly probative in circumstances where one does want some corroboration and by the very private nature of the offence will be difficult to come by.
The legal system should have handled Pell in the way that only Heydon Dyson (OK – Dyson Heydon) said they should. From the article:
Heydon was somewhat ahead of the public on whether to believe an allegation of professional predation. He bemoaned that such an allegation’s1 seeming bizarreness meant that a prosecution based on it alone “may easily falter, no matter how truthful,” even when — as Stubley’s patient testified — the allegation was of years of persistent indecent assaults and rapes perpetrated in a psychiatrist’s office, her sobbing throughout. That’s why, he said, such claims of predation shouldn’t be heard on their own. Quoting Western Australia’s evidence law statute, he declared that “fair-minded people would think that that the public interest” would favour hearing “similar testimony about the tendency of the accused.” … Regardless, he was alone on the High Court in 2011. The other four judges who heard Stubley’s case 2 Susan Kiefel and Virginia Bell 3 — all allowed the psychiatrist’s appeal. …
These judges’ words, in sharp contrast to Heydon’s own, could be music to the ears of any barrister asked to defend the former judge if he is prosecuted for crimes against some of the people whose accounts have emerged this week. If Heydon admits doing the particular acts he is accused of — say, touching a woman’s thighs or hugging or kissing her — but says that the woman consented to those acts, then the majority’s ruling on Stubley’s appeal would bar the prosecution from using others’ accounts of his misconduct, no matter how similar or non-consensual or well-established, to convict him. In short, the majority’s judgement takes the “too” out of #metoo.
I am long on the record as saying that the High Court’s approach to such cases is seriously wrong. Six years previously, the national court had unanimously allowed the appeal of a different alleged predator, a teenager convicted of the rapes or attempted rapes of six different teenagers, by ruling that he should have been tried separately for each. Why? Because he had testified that each of the six consented to sex with him, only to later accuse him of rape. (Remarkably, the sixth instance occurred while he was on bail on charges of raping the other five.) The national court ruled that, as a result, their testimony could not establish any pattern about the accused, but only cast light on their own, separate, decisions not to consent to sex with him.
- 1. Of a psychiatrist’s having sex with his patients.