It is generally accepted that Popper did not give a thorough account of the way that science actually works, and that is supposed to indicate that by the 1960s he was a bit out of things. Perhaps he did some interesting work back in the 1930s that challenged the logical positivists, but that was such a long time ago, of course things have moved on from there. Now we have the penetrating insights of Thomas Kuhn with The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1961). And then along came Imre Lakatos, the strong program in the sociology of science, and fieldwork like the major project carried out in the Walter and Eliza Hall by Charlesworth and associates.
Ian C Jarvie has launched a strong challenge to that view of Popper. He is a Canadian member of the Popperian Mafia with a special line of interest in sociology, including the sociology of the modern cienema. In 2001 be published a book called The Republic of Science: The Emergence of Popper’s Social View of Science 1935-1945. The dust jacket announces:
This book offers a careful re-reading of Popper’s classic falsificationist demarcation of science, stressing its institutional aspects. Popper’s social thinking about science, individuals, institutions, and rationality is tracked through The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society and its Enemies as he criticises and improves his earlier work. New links are established between the works of the 1935-1945 period, revealing them as a source for criticism of the institutions and governance of science.
Jarvie argues strenuously that Popper’s first major work in early 1930s can be interpreted to anticipate the “social turn” in the philosophy of science. This may be called the “strong version” of his thesis, by analogy with the strong program in the sociology of science. A weaker version of Jarvie’s thesis, which is equally fruitful but possibly less controversial, is that Popper should be regarded as a conventionalist in scientific methodology (not to be confused with conventionalism as a theory of truth). Jarvie has argued convincingly that the decisive achievement of Logik der Forschung was to show the indispensable function of methodological conventions as “rules of the game” in science. This mirrors Popper’s approach to political philosophy; as the function of the philosophy of science is to formulate and criticize the “rules of the game” of science, so the function of moral and political philosophy is to do the same for the “rules of the game” of social and political life. These rules may be unwritten conventions, mores and folkways, traditions, laws of the land and institutions of all kinds.
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