Lottery policies – places for transparent arbitrariness
Posted by Richard Tsukamasa Green on Friday, December 31, 2010
As a summer exercise I’ve been thinking about places where more lotteries might be a good idea. By lotteries, I mean a decision maker selecting an option randomly, albeit perhaps from a selected pool, rather than using flawed criteria. After all, in a complex and uncertain world, even the best available criteria will be flawed and will insert some arbitrariness into the system. At best this just results random bad choices. At worst it will promote adverse behavior and selection and resentment amongst participants. Why not just make arbitrariness transparent and more purely random?
The Peter Principle is one (humourous but insightful) example, often put as “people are promoted to their level of incompetence”. Using the available criteria of people who are competent in their current jobs, selection of those to be promoted often fails to select the bets candidates for duties higher in the hierarchy. The bad selections oly become apparent when someone fails to perform in their new role. Plunchino and Rapisarda, after crunching the concept through game theory, found that random promotion may be the most efficient way of selecting those to promote.
Hierarchies, both in government and in the corporate sector, are rife with terrible selection procedures. The Peter Principle merely choses people on a criteria that doesn’t reflect what is really wanted. Many selection techniques actively choose bad traits. I’ve talked about the way narcissism may be partly responsible for a gender bias in executive positions. Those who are over confident are much more likely to put themselves forward, and to be able to sell themselves to decision makers. Unfortunately the most confident people are over confident. They’ll tend to be risk seeking, over estimate their own judgement and disregard advice, have an inflated sense of their own value (and subsequent entitlements) as well as an ability to deflect blame and subsequently fail to learn from mistakes. In short, you might be choosing the kind of person that takes a company down a risky road to the cost of stockholders, employees and eventually taxpayers – and then considers that they deserve a large bonus. Perhaps random promotion would have resulted in a broader array of neurological types, and more sober and responsible decision making from executives – or at least the kind that aren’t predisposed to exploit the principal-agent problem whenever it arises. It certainly would address the critique of quotas that Nicholas gives here, where a quota for women would merely promote narcissistic women.
Another problem with flawed criteria is that participants will quickly start altering their behavior to target it. If you start rewarding teachers based on test results, you risk them teaching to the test or “juking the stats”. When it comes to selections, this behavior may be very costly and, like persuasive advertising, is an aggregate economic loss. It’s only virtue is affecting the selection, often to the detriment of the quality of the decision, and at the expense of other behavior that might benefit the broader context, whether the organisation or society. In the hierarchical context, this can mean brown nosing and sycophancy at the expense of actual work (and which may be damaging to morale), or behavior that looks like hard work instead of productive work. The long working hours in Japanese firms are often filled with not very much work for the sole reason that selection favours the easily observable (working hours) over the less easily observable (productivity) – this has social costs of course, but it also means a tired and less productive workforce. (Continued)


